Multilateralism, Major Powers, and Militarized Disputes by Corbetta, Renato & Dixon, William J.
Grand Valley State University
ScholarWorks@GVSU
Peer Reviewed Articles Political Science and International Relations
3-2004
Multilateralism, Major Powers, and Militarized
Disputes
Renato Corbetta
Grand Valley State University, corbettr@gvsu.edu
William J. Dixon
University of Arizona
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/pls_articles
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science and International Relations at ScholarWorks@GVSU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Peer Reviewed Articles by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@GVSU. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@gvsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Corbetta, Renato and Dixon, William J., "Multilateralism, Major Powers, and Militarized Disputes" (2004). Peer Reviewed Articles. 3.
https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/pls_articles/3
Public debate on American foreign policy is said to bedominated by two contentious issues. One of these,the longstanding struggle between isolationism and
internationalism, has for now largely subsided in favor of
the latter, particularly following the events of September 11,
2001. As a consequence of America’s prevailing internation-
alist spirit, the equally truculent debate between multilater-
alism and unilateralism has now moved center stage (e.g.,
Kagan 2003; Prestowitz 2003; Nye 2002; Patrick and
Forman 2002). Are American interests best served by coop-
erating with other countries or by “going it alone”? 
The unprecedented degree of international cooperation
observed during the 1991 Persian Gulf War revitalized
interest in and hopes for multilateralism. Many analysts pre-
dicted that in the post-Cold War era, states’ foreign policy
will be characterized by a greater degree of multilateralism
(Ruggie 1992). The failure or limited success of successive
multilateral initiatives—such as, operation “Restore Hope”
in Somalia and the Bosnia peacekeeping mission—and a
renewed tendency on the part of the United States to prefer
bilateral negotiations in the economic and security arena
somewhat dampened early enthusiasms (Martin 1992; Stoll
1998). More recent choices by the United States—ranging
from withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and other multi-
lateral treaties to military action in Iraq—have led foreign
leaders to voice their resentment against the arrogance of
the country’s unilateralist stance (see, for instance, Nye
2002; Wallace 2002). 
The United States’ apparent proclivity to privilege unilat-
eral action or limited bilateralism seems to reinforce the
widespread conviction that great powers are more likely to
act unilaterally on the international stage. This view is based
on the observation that, given their greater capabilities and
potential for action, great powers enjoy a wider range of
options and face fewer structural constraints (Waltz 1979;
Patrick 2002). The logic of this argument is that is that they
are more prone to act alone because they have the opportu-
nity to do so. However, the relationship between major
power status and international multilateral behavior has not
received adequate attention in international relations. The
issue of multilateralism has been treated, to a large extent,
as a question tangential to the larger problem of inter-state
cooperation. As a result, the discipline of international rela-
tions lacks any “off-the-shelf” theory for explaining multi-
lateralism (Caporaso 1992: 604). The absence of a theory of
multilateralism is accompanied by relative scarcity of sys-
tematic evidence concerning the relative propensity of
major power states to act in coordination with other states. 
This article addresses the question of whether major
power status affects the tendency of states to act multilater-
ally by looking at instances of collective participation in mil-
itarized interstate disputes (MIDs). Because great powers
have a larger number of strategic and economic interests
and greater capacity for projection, they tend to become
involved in a larger number of international disputes than
less powerful states (Siverson and Starr 1990; Enterline
1999). Yet, the nature of this involvement remains unspeci-
fied. On the one hand, because of their capabilities and
status, major powers are largely independent of other actors’
support and enjoy greater chances to achieve a favorable
outcome in a dispute. Therefore, one can expect that major
powers are more likely to initiate or intervene in a dispute
unilaterally. On the other hand, the opposite hypothesis
stating that great powers prefer to participate multilaterally
in said disputes cannot be ruled out a priori. It is possible
for major power status to influence participation in conflicts
either directly or indirectly, as a result of a host of state-level
and structural factors. 
Using conflict as a framework for analyzing multilateral-
ism represents an alternative approach to the more common
focus on international organizations (IOs), international
regimes, and international law. Membership in IOs and
adherence to the rules established by regimes and treaties
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often reflect genuine commitment to multilateralism and
multilateral institutions. Yet, collective participation in con-
flict often requires a high level of policy coordination and
the willingness to risk greater short-term costs and unpre-
dictable long-term consequences (Patrick 2002; Wedgwood
2002). Collective participation in international disputes
may represent a higher and more discriminating threshold
for testing great powers’ commitment to multilateralism. 
MULTILATERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
There is no agreed-upon definition of what constitutes
multilateral action in the international relations literature.
Scholars focus on either qualitative or quantitative aspects
of multilateralism. Qualitative definitions center on the
presence of specific principles underlying collective actions
or agreements that are universally applied to all of the actors
involved (Ruggie 1992). According to these definitions,
non-discrimination, reciprocity, and self-restraint must be
present for a collective endeavor to be considered multilat-
eral. Alternatively, quantitative definitions of multilateralism
concentrate on the number of actors involved in interna-
tional actions. For instance, Kalher (1992) offers a distinc-
tion between multilateralism and minilateralism based on
the numbers of participants. Nonetheless, while they dis-
agree on a specific definition, most scholars appear to
concur on what the essential traits of a multilateral action
are. At its minimum, multilateralism can be defined as “the
practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three
or more states” (Keohane 1990: 731). Keohane’s characteri-
zation of multilateralism contains both a qualitative and a
quantitative dimension. It captures the most important
aspect of multilateralism—i.e., the willingness of states to
condition their actions to collective decisions about what
policies should be pursued. It also sets a minimal threshold
concerning the number of states among which collective
decision-making should take place. Because of these char-
acteristics, Keohane’s (1990) definition is adopted here. 
This is a narrow, “minimalist” conception of multilateral-
ism. As indicated by Ruggie (1992), based on this definition
alone, it can be difficult to discriminate between different
degrees of collective policy coordination. It is assumed that
the effort and commitment necessary for policy coordina-
tion among three actors is equivalent to those required to
act multilaterally with a larger number of partners. A narrow
definition of this kind also overlooks both the subtler dis-
tinctions between cooperation and coordination identified
by Stein (1990) and other scholars (Caporaso 1992), and
the goals to which policy coordination is aimed. However, a
minimalist notion of multilateralism has the advantage of
setting a clear distinction between unilateral action, bilateral
cooperation, and multilateralism. Being able to categorize
events—in this case participation in disputes- according to
the above definition—allows us to identify a specific popu-
lation of cases suitable to empirical analysis.
Collective participation in militarized conflict provides a
novel perspective for the analysis of multilateralism. This
topic has often been looked at in the context of international
institutions or international law (see, for instance, Caporaso
1992; Martin 1992; Ruggie 1992; Kahler 1992). Yet, Capo-
raso notes that multilateralism does not require a peaceful
objective. States may engage in multilateral activities against
other states. As Weber’s (1992) analysis of the U.S. commit-
ment to multilateralism within NATO indicates, alliances
can be vehicles and expressions of multilateral behavior just
as other international institutions. Collective efforts aimed
at imposing sanctions on defecting states in the context of
international regimes and agreements are generally consid-
ered as examples of multilateral action and commitment to
multilateral principles. The concept of multilateralism has
also been applied in the realm of international security and
conflict management. For example, collective peacekeeping
missions and instances of collective use of force are often
offered as examples of multilateralism in practice (Wedg-
wood 2002). Indeed, the large international coalition that
came together in 1991 to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait
has been acclaimed as an outstanding instance of multilat-
eral action (Stoll 1998; Patrick 2002). 
Some might object that the typically ad hoc and transitory
n a t u re of military coalitions diminishes their multilateral
c h a r a c t e r. While it may be true that multilateralism has most
often been studied in the context of relatively enduring insti-
tutions such as treaties or IGOs, we continue to concur with
Keohane (1990) that the essence of multilateralism lies in the
c o o rdination of national policies, not in its surro u n d i n g
institutional context. More o v e r, we see no reason to believe
that coordination of military policy among three or more
actors is apt to re q u i re significantly less negotiation, com-
p romise, and adaptation than the institutionalized coord i n a-
tion of, say, trade or environmental policies. In fact, from this
standpoint one might plausibly argue that cooperation in ad
hoc military coalitions might at times re p resent an even
g reater commitment to multilateralism than coord i n a t i o n
with known partners in the context of predictable institu-
tions marked by standard operating pro c e d u res. We are dis-
inclined to go too far with this argument since our aim is
m o re modest—it is merely to show that military coalitions
a re a legitimate vehicle for the study of multilateralism. 
While some attention has been given to the collective par-
ticipation in interstate conflict (e.g., Mousseau 1997; We rn e r
and Lemke 1997), we know of no attempts explicitly to ana-
lyze multilateral behavior in the context of militarized inter-
state disputes. MIDs are united historical cases in which the
t h reat, display, or use of military force short of war by one
member state is explicitly directed toward the govern m e n t ,
o fficial re p resentatives, official forces, pro p e rt y, or terr i t o ry of
another state (Jones, Bre m e r, and Singer 1996: 168). Because
they involve the threat, display, or use of military force, inter-
state disputes constitute an interesting “intermediate” level of
analysis between states’ multilateral part i c i p a t i o n.1
6 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY
1 The vast majority of MIDs observed from 1816 through 1992, 84 per-
cent, start and end as one-on-one affairs (Jones, Bremer, and Singer
1996: 194). 
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MAJOR POWER STATES AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
Careful observation of militarized disputes reveals that
the presence of multiple participants appears to be related
to a dispute’s intensity, duration, and outcome. Interestingly,
the involvement of major powers has similar effects. The
presence of at least one great power increases the likelihood
that a dispute will last longer and reach higher hostility
levels. In addition, disputes involving the presence of major
powers are more likely to come to a definitive termination,
with one or more major powers being on the winning side.
Disputes among minor powers are instead more likely to
end in a stalemate (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). 
What sets major powers apart from other states? There is
a surprisingly widespread agreement with regard to what
traits elevate a state to the rank of a major power and who
the major powers have been in history. Scholars of conflict
agree that major power status is determined by both tangi-
ble assets, such as the possession of above-average material
capabilities, and by intangible elements, such as reputation.
Analysts have relied on the definition provided in the Cor-
relates of War (COW) project. The criteria originally used in
the COW project for identifying a state as a major power
“reflect the aggregated or collective judgement of the system
membership. That is, a major power in any period is a state
that is regarded by others—especially the other and typi-
cally more well-established majors—as one of that small
‘oligarchy’, to use Schwarzenberger’s expression, that domi-
nates not only in the region of each member, but globally as
well. These states have taken on global interests and do a
fair job of defending them” (Singer 1987: 121). “By defini-
tion, major powers are those actors with global (or at least
multiregional) interests and capabilities” (Siverson and Starr
1991: 61-62). But just who are (or have been) the world’s
major powers? When asked this question by COW project
researchers, diplomatic historians achieved a remarkable
consensus around the states listed in Table 1 (Singer 1987). 
In general, much is known about the propensity of great
powers to become involved in conflicts, either wars or sub-
war disputes. “Major power states are argued in the litera-
ture to gravitate to militarized conflicts, both because they
have an interest in solving these matters to suit their own
preferences, and because they have the capabilities to affect
the outcomes of these conflicts” (Enterline 1999: 16). Given
their wide range of economic, strategic, and political inter-
ests, and considering their capacity to project power beyond
their own borders, it should not be surprising that great
powers “account for a large proportion of the conflict behav-
ior in the international system” (Gochman 1980: 89). For
instance, by focusing specifically on war, Levy (1982) finds
that great powers are historically more war-prone than other
states and that, between 1495 and 1975, the “amount of
war” in which they have engaged has been constant over
time and unaffected by the amount of conflicts in previous
periods. In addition, even when they do not directly initiate
a conflict, major powers appear to have a lower utility
threshold regarding the option of entering ongoing wars
(Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979). The multiplicity of
their interests leads major powers to perceive some utility
even in other states’ conflicts and makes them more likely to
intervene in those quarrels. 
Regarding disputes, major powers have been involved in
over half of the MIDs occurring between 1816 and 1976
(Gochman and Maoz 1990: 202). It has been found that a
major power is more likely to become involved in a dispute
against a minor power than against another major power.
Major powers are more likely to initiate a dispute than
minor powers (Gochman and Maoz 1990: 202-03), but
they also tend to enter ongoing disputes as third parties at a
faster rate than other states (Enterline 1999). When they do
so, they are more likely to be on the winning side (Stoll
1998). Nonetheless, regardless of whether they are initiators
or participants, the presence of major powers in militarized
disputes increases the likelihood that other actors will inter-
vene, and that such conflicts will become multiparty in
nature (Gochman and Maoz 1990: 203). 
However, there is evidence that major powers behave as
rational actors with regard to conflict involvement. Before
they start or join an ongoing conflict, major powers evalu-
ate how capabilities are distributed, the potential for inter-
vention of allies and third parties, and the likelihood that
other major powers may become involved (Yamamoto and
Bremer 1980; Siverson and King 1980; Bueno de Mesquita
1981; Huth 1998). In general, the literature on great powers
and conflict involvement suggests that, because the most
powerful states have global interests and are more likely to
participate in conflicts of different kind, they attempt to
maximize the returns and reduce the costs of such partici-
pation. Because—as indicated by Stoll (1998)—collective
security initiatives have a greater likelihood of being suc-
cessful, multilateralism may be a viable strategy for major
power states to diffuse the costs of conflict involvement,
while enjoying the dividends of victory.
Additional factors other than rational calculation and
breadth of interests may help explain the greater proneness
of major powers to become involved in conflicts in a multi-
lateral fashion. Historically, major powers have shown
greater propensity than small states to become members of
alliances and have a large number of allies (Siverson and
King 1980; Siverson and Sullivan 1984; Siverson and
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; TABLE 1
MAJOR POWER STATUS, 1816-2002
Austria-Hungary 1816-1918
China 1950-2002
France 1816-1940, 1945-2002
Germany/Prussia 1816-1918, 1925-1945, 1991-2002
Italy 1860-1943
Japan 1895-1945
Russia/USSR 1816-1917, 1922-2002
United Kingdom 1816-2002
United States 1898-2002
Source: Singer (1987) and Correlates of War 2 Project (2003).
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Emmons 1991). Several studies have provided evidence
that, for great powers, the relationship between number of
alliances, number of allies, and conflict involvement is a
positive one (Singer and Small 1966; Gochman 1980; Siver-
son and King 1980; Siverson and Sullivan 1984; Kegley and
Raymond 1982; Siverson and Starr 1991; Huth 1998).
Other forms of “associational ties,” such as trade relation-
ships and membership in IOs, have been found to be related
to the amount of conflicts in which great powers participate
(Gochman 1980). Finally, because of the amount of capa-
bilities they possess, major power states can also exercise a
considerable “pull” on other states and manage to drag them
into a conflict, either through coercion or through the
dynamics of conflict diffusion (Siverson and Starr 1991). 
Thus, existing studies on multilateralism and major
powers’ conflict involvement tell us that major power status
is positively related to participation in various forms of con-
flict. Yet, little is explicitly said or known about the nature
of this involvement. A cursory examination of recent major
powers’ actions may suggest that they are more prone to act
unilaterally because they have the opportunity to do so. Yet,
other determinants of great powers’ conflict involvement
unveiled in the literature indirectly generate the expectation
that great powers will favor a multilateral form of participa-
tion. The two rival hypotheses concerning the form of major
power intervention in interstate disputes are further devel-
oped in the following section. 
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
The expectation that great powers will act in coordina-
tion with other states in the international arena goes against
the lesson that could be learned from observing recent
behavior by the United States. The greater capabilities of
major power states seem to decrease their dependence on
other countries, while increasing their ability to project
power and the likelihood that they will be able to steer the
outcome of a dispute in their favor unilaterally. The propen-
sity of major powers to “go it alone” is reinforced by the fact
that minor powers will be able to contribute significantly to
the outcome of a dispute only in rare circumstance. The
costs of coordinating policies with lesser powers may out-
weigh the benefits that can be received through unilateral
action. For instance, both during the civil war in Bosnia in
the early 1990s and during the Kosovo crisis of 1999, the
United States was torn between its desire to act collectively
through NATO and the need to compromise on its preferred
course of action. While multilateral action was deemed to
have greater potential to stop Serbia, the United States was
forced to engage in extensive diplomatic bargaining in order
to convince its NATO allies to carry out air strikes. Similarly,
in the attempt to garner more partners in the very recent
invasion of Iraq, the United States was forced to delay the
beginning of military operations well past the timetable
originally set by the Bush administration. 
By this logic it is the smaller, less powerful states that
privilege multilateral foreign policy behavior in order to
d i ffuse the costs of such policy choices (Dixon 1984; Patrick
2002). Moreover, smaller states may often have foreign
policy interests that conflict with those of great power states.
When this occurs, great powers will not seek the help of
minor powers who, in turn, are likely to withdraw their
support or oppose collective involvement in a dispute. An
additional motive for great powers to eschew multilateral
action is that they fear the erosion of power and status set in
motion by bandwagoning effects and by the division of the
“spoils of victory” (Schweller 1994). Powerful states may
find the help of their partners inconsequential or outright
detrimental when a dispute ensues. Major powers may then
prefer to act alone not only because they can, but also in
order to avoid small states’ attempts to free-ride or the risk
of their defection. 
However, the reverse conditions may also occur. Great
powers may seek the support of smaller states in order to
diffuse the costs of more frequent conflict involvements.
The advantages derived from sharing the costs incurred in a
dispute may surpass the costs of policy coordination. In
addition, major powers tend to have more allies and multi-
ple, overlapping international organization (IO) member-
ships. Such factors may increase the likelihood of multilat-
eral participation in disputes. Alliances and other
institutional agreements may contain formal provisions
specifying the conditions under which partners have to pro-
vide support (Leeds et al. 2000). Membership in IOs and
alliances may also instill the habit of coordinating policies
with other states. Great powers may also be willing to act
multilaterally because collective actions are more likely to
be perceived as legitimate by the international community.
Finally, it is reasonable to expect that great powers are more
likely to act multilaterally exactly because minor powers are
prone to jump on the bandwagon or volunteer their contri-
bution in exchange for future benefits (Schweller 1994). 
A partial answer to these conflicting hypotheses is
obtained through an examination of the simple bivariate
relationship between major power status and multilateral
participation in militarized disputes. The unit of analysis
here is state participation in militarized disputes. Partici-
pants are classified as major powers according to the listing
in Table 1 above. A participation is defined as multilateral if
there are at least two additional states participating on the
same side of the dispute.2 Under this definition the 2003
invasion of Iraq would qualify as multilateral due to the par-
ticipation of U.S., U.K., and Australian forces. Similarly, the
original enforcement of Iraqi “no-fly” zones by the U.S.,
U.K., and France was a multilateral action, though it later
lost this status with the withdrawal of France. One potential
weakness of this definition is that it may too easily treat
independent and uncoordinated actions as multilateral. To
guard against this possibility we will also examine a much
8 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY
2 Note that if three states participate on the same side in a single dispute
it counts as three multilateral observations. We do realize that this oper-
ational rule raises questions regarding the independence of observations,
an issue we come back to later.
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m o re restrictive definition of multilateral part i c i p a t i o n
requiring that each state begin its dispute involvement on
the same day.
Table 2 displays joint distributions and odds ratios for
1816-2002 and for two periods split at 1900.3 The results
are remarkably consistent in showing that major powers are
substantially more likely than small and middle powers to
participate in disputes multilaterally. This effect is especially
pronounced during the 19th century when major powers
were nearly four times more likely to engage in multilateral
dispute participation. Although the effect diminishes in the
period after 1900 it still reveals major powers to be almost
twice as likely to join with others in militarized disputes.
Our more restrictive indicator of multilateral action pro-
duces substantially identical results even though it admits
fewer than half the 854 multilateral participations of the
original definition.4
These preliminary results are striking, but the bivariate
analysis does not allow us to conclude that the relationship
between great power status and multilateral participation in
MIDs is not spurious. Major power status per se may not
affect the propensity for a dispute to become multilateral.
Rather, multilateralism may be the result of the host of con-
trol variables that have been found in the literature to be
related to great powers’ behavior in conflict situations and
that have been addressed in the preceding section. The
apparent propensity of powerful states to participate in con-
flicts multilaterally may also depend on the contextual char-
acteristics of the disputes in which great powers tend to
become involved. We explore these possibilities through
multivariate analysis in the following section. 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
Even though preliminary analysis shows a strong effect of
major power status on the probability of multilateral dispute
participation, we still have reason to remain skeptical.
Numerous confounding factors may intervene to mediate
the positive, direct effect of major power status on the
dependent variable. We shall consider two general classes of
potentially confounding variables based on relatively endur-
ing state level attributes and more transitory characteristics
of the immediate situation. 
The factors that may affect the likelihood of multilateral
p a rticipation in an interstate dispute and confound the dire c t
e ffect of great power status on the dependent variable are
summarized in Table 3. We have classified such factors as
“state-level” or “situational,” depending on whether they
relate to attributes of individual state actors or to the peculi-
arities of any given dispute. Each of the eight factors identi-
fied in Table 3 re p resent a hypothesis of spuriousness
between major power status and multilateral dispute part i c i-
pation. If one or more of the hypotheses are correct, then the
o b s e rved relationship between major power status and mul-
tilateral participation should diminish to zero once we contro l
for the suspect state level attributes and situational factors. 
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; TABLE 2
MULTILATERAL DISPUTE PARTICIPATION AND MAJOR POWER STATUS
Major power Non-major power Odds ratio
1816-2002 Multilateral 362 492
(23.1%) (12.2%)
Non-multilateral 1206 3540 2.16*
(76.9%) (87.8%) (.44)
1816-1900 Multilateral 97 51
(34.3%) (11.4%)
Non-multilateral 186 398 4.07*
(65.7%) (88.6%) (1.00)
1901-2002 Multilateral 265 441
(20.6%) (12.3%)
Non-multilateral 1020 3142 1.85*
(79.4%) (87.7%) (.42)
* p   .01
Cell entries represent individual state’s participation in militarized disputes during the specified time interval. Robust standard errors of the odds ratios are
3 The table is constructed from version 3.02 of the MID set (Ghosn and
Palmer. 2003).
4 Only 405 dispute participations qualify under the more restrictive defi-
nition. This indicator produces odds ratios of 1.9 (.42) for the full
period, and 7.8 (2.7) and 1.3 (.36) before and after 1900, respectively.
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State-level factors include organizational experience,
material capabilities, revisionism and democracy. Major
powers’ multilateral conflict behavior may be the result of
their tendency to have more allies and organizational ties.
We measure a state’s organizational experience with an
admittedly crude proxy variable comprised of its total
number of military alliance commitments.5 We assume that
it may be easier for a state with multiple organizational ties
to summon the support of its allies and partners when a dis-
pute arises. In addition, multiple organizational ties gener-
ate patterns of stable cooperation that: (1) “acclimate” and
prepare states to the requirements implicit in the efforts of
foreign policy coordination; and (2) reduce the costs of such
coordination efforts. 
High levels of material capabilities also provide major
power states with the wherewithal to project power and
engage in disputes both regionally and globally. Thus, major
powers’ multilateralism may be nothing more than a reflec-
tion of their extensive material capabilities. Material capa-
bilities are measured using the well known COW compos-
ite index (Singer 1987). Capabilities and major power status
may appear to be redundant, and the two variables do coin-
cide to a considerable extent. Yet, as discussed in the pre-
ceding sections, the overlap is neither perfect nor complete.
Historical evidence suggests that there is often a temporal
lag between a state’s accumulation of vast material capabili-
ties and its capacity to establish itself as a key regional or
global player. In contrast, some states have been considered
by other actors as great powers well after their declining
material capabilities could no longer match their status.6
Revisionism is the third state-level characteristic we con-
sider as a possible intervening variable.7 Revisionist states,
those who brazenly challenge the status quo, are apt to be
in the minority almost by definition. It is reasonable to
expect that isolated, revisionist states will be more likely to
act unilaterally—either as a result of having few allies or
because of their reluctance to coordinate policies with the
vast majority of status quo countries—and that the opposite
will be true of status quo powers. This reasoning suggests
that in any confrontation between major powers, the status
quo side is more likely to act multilaterally than the revi-
sionist challenger. The indicator is derived from the Milita-
rized Interstate Disputes data set, which classifies as revi-
sionist states that openly attempt “to challenge pre-dispute
conditions by (1) making claims to territory, (2) attempting
to overthrow a regime, or (3) declaring the intention not to
10 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY
; TABLE 3
FACTORS POTENTIALLY CONFOUNDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MAJOR POWER STATUS AND MULTILATERAL PARTICIPATION
IN MILITARIZED INTERSTATE DISPUTES
State attributes
Organizational experience based on memberships in IGOs or alliances facilitates policy coordination with other states and
major powers probably have more organizational experience than others.
Material capabilities help define major power status. Capabilities also extend the projection of power and may pro-
vide a means to attract or coerce others to join in disputes. 
Revisionist states are in the minority by definition. By challenging the status quo they are less likely to attract the
active support of other powers. 
Democracy fosters the multilateral participation as a way to legitimize the use of military force for both
domestic and international audiences. 
Situational factors
Interstate war is the most serious form of interstate dispute and tends to attract multiple actors. Major powers
are more likely than others to participate in wars. 
Dispute duration may be extended by the participation of major powers and longer disputes may attract addi-
tional participants either through coercion or coordination.
Multiple opponents may be another sign of intense or enlarged disputes which attract the interest of major powers.
Multiple opponents may encourage participation by allies.
Major power opponents like multiple opponents, may indicate enlarged disputes that prompt the wider interest of other
major powers.
5 The data are from Gibler and Sarkees (forthcoming). 
6 It is also plausible to argue that smaller powers will prefer to enter into
disputes multilaterally to overcome the limitations imposed by their
scarce capabilities and to share the costs of dispute involvement with
wealthier countries (Dixon 1984). We thus considered the alternative
hypothesis that both stronger and weaker states share the same propen-
sity toward multilateral participation in disputes. Although we tested for
such a U-shaped relationship, it was not borne out by any of our empir-
ical analyses. 
7 Revisionism is somewhat different than other state-level characteristic
because it reflects the state’s position on a particular issue rather than a
more enduring attribute of the state itself. 
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abide by another state’s policy” (Jones, Bremer, and Singer
1996: 178). States are coded as 1 if revisionist, otherwise 0. 
D e m o c r a c y, our final state-level attribute, may foster mul-
tilateral dispute participation as a way to legitimize the use of
m i l i t a ry force both for domestic and international audiences
(Mousseau 1997). Such an effect was apparently evident
during the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq when the
U.S. and U.K. tried but failed to obtain explicit authorization
f rom the Security Council. And once the war began both
g o v e rnments took great pains to publicly portray their mili-
t a ry action as the eff o rt of a broad coalition comparable to
that of the 1991 Gulf Wa r. More o v e r, because some of the
most internationally active major powers have also been the
most democratic (e.g., U.K., U.S., France), it may be that it
is democracies, not major powers, that are prone to multilat-
eral dispute participation. Our measure of democracy
employs indicators from the well-known Polity IV pro j e c t ;
following Jaggers and Gurr (1995) we use the diff e re n c e
between the Polity democracy and autocracy indices (i.e.,
democracy minus autocracy) which ranges from +10 to –10. 
The level of intensity of a dispute, its duration, and the
opposing participants comprise what we term situational
factors. First, we would expect disputes that reach the level
of interstate war will have a greater probability of involving
multiple participants on each side. Moreover, we know that
major powers are generally much more likely to engage in
war than other states. Therefore, the multilateral dispute
involvement observed of major powers may merely reflect
the intensity of disputes. Similarly, the duration of a dispute
may influence the observed great powers-multilateral par-
ticipation relationship. Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996:
188) find that “the larger the role of major powers in a dis-
pute, the longer the dispute is expected to be.” Longer dis-
putes involving major powers are likely to elicit the partici-
pation of a greater number of actors, as an indirect result of
the dynamics of diffusion endogenous to all conflicts and/or
“the pull” exercised by great powers. Finally, the number of
opponents on one side in the dispute may confound the
impact of major power status on the likelihood that a dis-
pute will be multilateral. It is possible that, either as initia-
tors or participants in a dispute, great powers will attract a
greater number of opponents than would normally be the
case. The presence of a large number of opponents or of
major power opponents may lead to the expansion and dif-
fusion of the conflict, which would then attract an even
larger number of participants on both sides. The resulting
participation will thus be classified as multilateral, but
major power status may not have had any direct effect on the
multilateral character of the dispute.
Indicators for all of the variables that have been labeled
as “situational” are taken from version 3.02 of the Milita-
rized Interstate Disputes data set. Interstate war is registered
as a dichotomous variable based on the highest act under-
taken by the participating state. The duration of disputes are
measured in logged days to accommodate the expected
nonlinearity. And finally, we use a pair of dichotomous indi-
cators registering whether each participant faces more than
one opponent or not, and whether a major power is among
the opponents or not. All situational controls are expected
to have a positive effect on the probability of multilateral
dispute participation. 
Estimation results are displayed in Table 4. The main
entries in each column are unstandardized logistic regres-
sion estimates with robust standard errors in parenthesis.
The first column lists results for the entire period with the
remaining columns containing time periods paralleling
those in Table 2.8 The results are easily summarized. The
full period (1816-2002) and both sub-periods deliver quite
comparable results showing that major power status contin-
ues to have a substantial positive impact on the likelihood
of multilateral dispute participation. Contrary to the logic
outlined above, in no case does the presence of controls sig-
nificantly diminish the estimated effect of major power
status. In fact, the major power estimates in the top row of
Table 4 are consistently larger than the same estimates
absent the control variables.9 Moreover, these results remain
essentially intact when we replicate the estimations with our
more restrictive definition of multilateralism.10
The control variables generally work as anticipated
though with varying success across the different time peri-
ods. Among the state level attributes, the observed effect of
revisionism was most consistent with our prior expecta-
tions—revisionist states do appear to be less likely than
others to participate in militarized disputes multilaterally.
Perhaps most surprising was finding that the major power
propensity toward multilateral participation appears to be
largely independent of material capabilities despite the
strong correlation (r = .76) between capabilities and major
power status. Although we should not make too much of
this single finding, it is at least consistent with the idea that
major power status is not conveyed by national capabilities
alone. The absence of any discernable effect of democracy
on multilateralism is also surprising. The finding reinforces
the notion that the effects of regime type and democracy on
conflict behavior are more likely to be detected in a dyadic
context, rather than in the examination of monadic deci-
sions to take part in disputes. It also suggests, at least indi-
rectly, that autocratic major powers are equally as likely to
draw the support of lesser powers. Finally, the finding may
be a function of the fact that all MID involvements, not only
dispute initiations, are included in the analysis. The need to
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8 The number of observations declines in Table 4 for two reasons. First,
all 84 MID participations occurring in 2001 are lost due to the absence
of alliance data. And second, there are an additional 479 part i c i p a t i o n s
with missing data on the democracy index. Dropping democracy and
number of allies from the analysis to pre s e rve all 5600 part i c i p a t i o n
t h rough 2001 yields results virtually identical to those re p o rted in
Table 4.
9 Exponentiating logistic estimates transforms them into odds ratios.
Stated as odds ratios, the major power effect in Table 4 is 3.8 for the full
time period, and 5.3 and 3.6 for the periods before and after 1900.. 
10 The comparable major power logit estimates are 1.042 (.378) for the
full period, and2.243 (.535) and .784 (.358) for the periods before and
after 1900. 
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legitimize conflict participation in the eyes of domestic and
international audiences may be necessary only when demo-
cratic regimes contemplate aggression. 
With the exception of the presence of a major power
opponent, the situational factors generally perf o rm e d
according to expectations. The results confirm that multilat-
eral participation is encouraged in disputes that escalate to
war, that are of long duration, and that have multiple oppo-
nents. Even so, the presence of a major power opponent
actually appears to diminish the likelihood of multilateral-
ism, not increase it. Further investigation of this puzzling
finding reveals that there is virtually no bivariate relation-
ship between multilateralism and the presence of a major
power opponent (r = .015); the negative re l a t i o n s h i p
obtains only in the context of the specification in Table 4. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Our purpose in this study was narrowly focused on
exposing any relationship that might exist between major
power status and multilateral dispute participation. A sum-
mary evaluation of recent behavior on the part of the United
States supports the expectation of a major power’s propen-
sity to eschew multilateral military action largely because
they have the opportunity and the means to do so. By this
reasoning unilateralism is the preferred form of action
whenever possible because it best preserves both sover-
eignty and the freedom to influence outcomes. And yet,
given the fact that major powers are disproportionately
involved in militarized conflicts as well as alliances and
other international institutions, it also seemed plausible that
such powers might actually be more prone to multilateral
participation even if only as a function of their overall level
of global military interests and activities. 
To choose between these contending expectations we
turned to an empirical examination of participation in mili-
tarized interstate disputes since 1816. Dispute participation
qualified as multilateral if there were at least two other par-
ties on the same side, though we also considered a more
restrictive operational definition requiring all parties to have
entered the dispute on the same day. Since the choice of def-
inition proved immaterial to our conclusions we reported
results from just the less restrictive conception of multilat-
eral participation. These results were unambiguous: major
powers are clearly more prone to participate multilaterally
than are other states. Moreover, this empirical relationship
appears exceedingly stable across the 19th and 20th cen-
turies and in the face of several potentially confounding
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; TABLE 4
LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF MULTILATERAL DISPUTE PARTICIPATION ON MAJOR POWER STATUS WITH SELECTED CONTROLS
1816-2000 1816-1900 1901-2000
Major power 1.330** 1.660** 1.286**
(.314) (.412) (.306)
Material capabilities –3.974 –1.792 –6.618**
(2.372) (1.773) (2.157)
Number of allies .012 .133* .016*
(.008) (.068) (.008)
Revisionist state –.877** –.352 –.1.022**
(.136) (.197) (.165)
Democracy –.018 –.005 -.025
(.014) (.016) (.016)
Interstate war 1.272** 1.263** 1.335**
(.143) (.287) (.185)
ln(Duration) .369** .255** .388**
(.029) (.063) (.033)
Multiple opponents .724** –.150 .844**
(.152) (.320) (.184)
Major power opponents –.602** –.465** –.617**
(.153) (.173) (.188)
Constant –3.396** –3.405** –3.458**
(.170) (.303) (.190)
Wald x2 (df = 9) 649.4** 119.6** 572.5**
Number of observations 5037 686 4351
* p   .05, ** p   .01
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f a ctors associated with state level attributes or the immedi-
ate conflict situation. 
Before closing we should acknowledge one important
qualification to our results. While we can conclude that
major powers are indeed more prone toward multilateral
participation than other states, our results alone cannot tell
us if this is due to their policy preferences, or to available
opportunities, or to some combination of the two.11 It is of
course possible that major powers do hold uncommonly
strong preferences for multilateral action. It is also possible
that most states prefer to act with others when they can, but
that major powers find it easier than others to recruit will-
ing partners. Unfortunately, our present research design in
incapable of disentangling opportunity from willingness
(Siverson and Starr 1990).
We began our remarks with reference to America’s cur-
rent debate between multilateralism and unilateralism.
While our study does not aid in resolving this debate—
which, after all, is as much about individual values as
geopolitical realities—it does bring to light heretofore over-
looked patterns in the historical use of multilateral action.
The major powers’ observed propensity to engage the world
multilaterally, particularly in the high stakes arena of milita-
rized conflict, is a finding that takes on added significance
against the backdrop of the current debate. But there are
additional empirical questions that remain unanswered. Do
major powers engage as readily in other forms of multilat-
eral action? Does institutional context make a difference?
Are major powers equally distinctive when engaging in
other forms of international behavior? Of course all these
questions assume that even with today’s unprecedented
concentration of military, economic, and cultural resources
in a single state, in a single hyperpower, that “major power”
is still a meaningful designation in world politics. 
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